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Abstract 
Firm lifecycle theory predicts that the Weighted Average Cost of Capital (WACC) will tend to fall over the 
lifecycle of the firm (Mueller, 2003, p. 80-81). However, given that previous research finds that corporate 
governance deteriorates as firms get older (Mueller and Yun, 1998; Saravia, 2014) there is good reason to 
suspect that the opposite could be the case, that is, that the WACC is higher for older firms. Since our literature 
review indicates that no direct tests to clarify this question have been carried out up till now, this paper aims to 
fill the gap by testing this prediction empirically. Our findings support the proposition that the WACC of 
younger firms is higher than that of mature firms. Thus, we find that the mature firm overinvestment problem 
is not intensified by a higher cost of capital, on the contrary, our results suggest that mature firms manage to 
invest in negative net present value projects even though they have access to cheaper capital. This finding sheds 
new light on the magnitude of the corporate governance problems found in mature firms.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Previous research on corporate governance and firm investment performance has found 
that, contrary to the observed behavior of young companies, mature firms tend to invest in 
projects with rates of return below their Weighted Average Cost of Capital (WACC). 
Moreover, these studies have concluded that the ultimate reason for the overinvestment 
problem is the breakdown of corporate governance mechanisms in mature firms (Mueller 
and Yun, 1998; Saravia, 2014). Now, given these findings of poor corporate governance in 
older firms, the question remains whether the overinvestment problems observed in mature 
firms may also be due to a potentially higher WACC for these firms.  
The lifecycle theory of the firm, on which the above mentioned research rests, predicts 
that the WACC will tend to fall over the lifecycle of the firm (Mueller, 2003, pp. 80-81). 
Although this is a sensible proposition, we find that no direct empirical tests on the trend of 
the WACC over the lifecycle of the firm have been undertaken until now. Importantly, since 
firm lifecycle theory states that when mature firms overinvest this causes both existing and 
potential shareholders to require a higher rate of return from then on, it is not a priori certain 
that the WACC of mature firms with such governance problems should be lower than that of 
young firms as submitted by the theory. Thus, a key objective of this paper is to fill this gap 
in the literature by testing empirically whether the WACC falls over the lifecycle of the firm 
as put forward by firm lifecycle theory.  
The importance of this paper is twofold. Firstly, as indicated above, empirical work on 
the tendency of the WACC over the lifecycle of the firm is nonexistent and, to the best our 
knowledge, ours is the first paper that investigates this issue empirically. The previous work 
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that comes closest to examining this topic is the empirical paper by Hasan, Hossain and 
Cheung (2015) who study the trend of the cost of equity over the lifecycle of Australian 
firms. These researchers find that the cost of equity has a tendency to fall as firms get older. 
However, they do not extend their research to investigate the behavior of the WACC over 
the lifecycle of the firm. Secondly, ours is the first paper that investigates empirically whether 
the overinvestment problems observed in mature firms are intensified by a higher WACC. In 
this paper we collect data on the WACC and other firm characteristics for a sample publicly 
listed of U.S. non-financial corporations over the 2000-2013 time period. After performing 
econometric tests, we find support for the proposition that the WACC of younger firms is 
significantly higher when compared to that of mature firms. As mentioned above, since 
Mueller and Yun (1998) and Saravia (2014) find that mature firms have poor corporate 
governance since they tend to overinvest in projects with rates of return below their WACC, 
our findings suggest that a higher cost of capital is not a contributing factor to the problem, 
on the contrary, our results suggest that mature firms manage to invest in negative present 
value projects despite their having access to cheaper sources of capital. This observation 
sheds new light on the magnitude of the corporate governance problems found in mature 
firms, since it suggests that mature firms are destroying value by overinvesting in projects 
with some of the lowest rates of return in the economy.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the lifecycle 
theory of the firm and develops testable propositions. Section 3 discusses our econometric 
specification. Section 4 presents our data sources, describes the sample, and discusses and 
documents our results. Section 5 concludes the paper. 
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2. THE LIFECYCLE THEORY OF THE FIRM AND THE WACC 
Taking as his starting point the contribution of Schumpeter (1934, 1943) that firms have 
a lifecycle, Mueller (1969, 1972, 2003, pp. 81-83) develops a firm lifecycle theory that 
focuses on the capital budgeting and cost of capital situations that firms face as they go 
through their lifecycles. We can best summarize Mueller’s theory with the aid of Figure 1.  
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
Figure 1(a) illustrates the situation faced by young firms. As can be seen, new companies 
have investment opportunities with an optimum at IY
*, i.e. the level of investment consistent 
with the point where the marginal rate of return, mrrY, equals the weighted average cost of 
capital, WACCY. Now, as is also shown in the figure, in order to exploit these investment 
opportunities young firms require more funds than the cash flows, CFY, they can generate 
internally from operations. Consequently, new firms need to tap outside sources of capital at 
a relatively high cost, WACCY, in order to invest at the optimal level. According to lifecycle 
theory this higher cost of capital is due to “the different opportunities for raising external 
capital generally faced by new firms” compared to the corresponding opportunities faced by 
mature firms (Mueller, 2003, p. 81). Hence the figure implies that, because of this abundance 
profitable investment opportunities, young firms can be characterized as fast growing 
companies that pay little or no dividends, which need to have good relationships with outside 
investors (i.e. good corporate governance) in order to have access to outside funds and reduce 
their cost of capital as much as possible. It is important to notice that these firms depend on 
outside sources of finance if they are to undertake the investment opportunities open to them 
before the competition beats them to it. 
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On the other hand, Figure 1(b) depicts the situation confronted by mature firms. 
According to lifecycle theory, mature firms are characterized by having investment 
opportunities which at the optimal level IM
* (the level of investment consistent with the point 
where the marginal rate of return, mrrM, equals the weighted average cost of capital, 
WACCM) require a smaller budget than the cash flows that the firm can generate internally 
from operations, CFM. Importantly, this financial independence which mature firms enjoy 
vis-à-vis shareholders and other investors causes conflicts of interest. As suggested by Jensen 
(1986), why would growth maximizing managers, who enjoy the benefits from the growth 
of their firms such as higher salaries and more and better perks (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), 
pay out free cash flows to investors and thwart the growth of their firms?  Wouldn’t they 
rather overinvest and make their firm grow faster as shown in the figure by investing at the 
infra-marginal level IM? The traditional answer in the finance literature is that if the 
management overinvests in this way, the market value of the firm would plunge and the firm 
would likely become the target of a hostile takeover (Manne, 1965; Mueller, 1969). The 
problem with this argument, however, is that while hostile takeovers may have been a 
problem for opportunistic managers in the 1980s, recent research suggests that for the last 30 
years managers and their boards of directors have been deploying a large number of anti-
takeover provisions which make the probability of success of a hostile takeover extremely 
small (Bebchuk, Cohen and Farrell, 2009; Cremers and Ferrell, 2014; Gompers, Ishii and 
Metrick, 2003). In other words, the threat of hostile takeovers has been effectively neutralized 
through the use of anti-takeover provisions, and for this reason firm lifecycle theory predicts 
that the managers of mature firms can and do overinvest in projects with a marginal rate of 
return which is lower than the corresponding weighted average cost of capital (i.e. these firms 
invest IM, a level of investment at which mrrM < WACCM in Figure 1(b)).  
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Now, most important for the purposes of the present paper, comparison between panels 
(a) and (b) in Figure 1 allows us to conjecture some important propositions regarding the 
behavior of the WACC over the lifecycle of the firm. In particular, this figure suggests that 
the WACC of mature firms should be lower than that of young firms for three reasons. The 
first is motivated by the illustrated increase in the size of cash flows from operations over the 
lifecycle of the firm. Clearly, since new firms are depicted as high-growth companies with 
relatively small cash flows from operations, which need external capital to exploit highly 
profitable investment opportunities, these companies will likely be willing and able to pay a 
high cost for the necessary capital. On the other hand, since mature firms are depicted as 
slow-growth companies with large cash flows from operations in excess of what is needed to 
invest optimally, that need not tap costly outside sources of capital, their WACC should be 
lower. Secondly, young firms usually have the most volatile cash flows. Since cash flow 
volatility increases the riskiness of the firm, high cash flow volatility should cause young 
firms to have a comparatively higher WACC. Conversely, since mature firms typically have 
more reliable and stable cash flows, this stability should reduce the riskiness and 
consequently the WACC of older firms. Thirdly, we put forward that there likely is a 
“reputation effect” that should cause the WACC of mature firms to be lower than that of 
young companies. Specifically, since the financial performance of mature firms is better 
known to investors they can rely on their past experience in dealing with the firm to assess 
the risk involved. In contrast, the future financial performance of new firms is more uncertain 
to investors. Therefore, the required return that investors demand from mature firms should 
be lower than that required from young corporations. Taken together, we expect that these 
three factors should more than compensate for the negative impact on the WACC of mature 
firms that results from the breakdown in corporate governance and the consequent 
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overinvestment in negative net present value projects as illustrated in Figure 1(b). 
Consequently, we expect that the prediction of firm lifecycle theory, that the WACC of young 
firms will be higher than that of old firms, will hold. 
We conclude this section by stating the testable propositions that will be investigated in the 
empirical sections of the paper. The main proposition, which follows directly from our 
discussion above, is that the WACC of the firm will tend to fall over its lifecycle. In addition 
to testing this qualitative proposition, we are interested in its quantitative impact. By how 
much does the WACC of young firms vs. that of mature companies differ? After how many 
years does it take for the WACC of a firm to fall below the average? We will examine these 
testable propositions in the empirical sections below. 
 
3. ECONOMETRIC SPECIFICATION 
We have seen that lifecycle theory predicts that the WACC is a function of firm age and 
other firm characteristics and that the first partial derivative of this function with respect to 
firm age is negative (that is, WACC declines as firms get older). However, the theory does 
not make any predictions regarding the sign of the higher derivatives. Consequently, we 
follow Mueller and Yun (1998, p. 359) and test the theory’s predictions using the following 
five econometric specifications: 
itititit CfirmageWACC   1                                                                            (1a) 
itititit CfirmageWACC   )/1(1                                                                     (1b) 
ititititit CfirmagefirmageWACC  
2
21
                                                   (1c) 
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ititititit CfirmagefirmageWACC   )/1()/1(
2
21
                                   (1d) 
       
itititit CfirmageWACC   )ln(1                                                                       (1e) 
Where WACC is the weighted cost of capital, firmage is the age of the firm measured in 
years since its incorporation and C is a vector of controls and firm characteristics (put forward 
by lifecycle theory) likely to determine the WACC. As elements of C we include cash flows 
from operations normalized by total assets (CF/totalassets) and the three year volatility of 
these cash flows (CFrisk), the debt to value ratio (D/(D+E)), Tobin’s q, the growth of sales 
of the firm over the previous year (salesgrowth), firm size measured as the natural logarithm 
of total assets (lnfirmsize), and finally industry and year dummy variables.1 As mentioned 
above, firm lifecycle theory predicts that β1 < 0 for specifications (1a), (1c) and (1e), and that 
β1 > 0 for specifications (1b) and (1d), but makes no predictions regarding the sign of β2. 
The reason for including cash flows from operations over total assets and the three year 
volatility follows directly from our discussion on firm lifecycle theory above. In particular, 
the notion that young firms should have higher WACC because of their relatively small and 
volatile cash flows from operations, while mature firms should have lower WACC because 
of their greater and more stable cash flows. Since we will control for firm size as indicated 
above, we expect a negative relationship between WACC and CF/totalassets, as firms with 
larger cash flows should have a lower probability of default. Conversely, we expect a positive 
relationship between WACC and CFrisk because the more volatile the cash flows the higher 
will be the risk of the firm and the return required by investors. 
                                                          
1 We describe our sources of data and how these variables are constructed in the appendix. 
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In addition, we include the debt to value ratio to control for the fact that since debt is usually 
cheaper than equity, other things equal firms with a higher debt to value ratio should have a 
lower WACC. On the other hand, we include Tobin´s q and the growth of sales of the firm 
over the previous year to control for the differences investment opportunities that different 
firms have. With Tobin’s q we aim to control for differences in potential investment 
opportunities, including growth through merger and acquisitions (Jovanovic and Rousseau, 
2002). Conversely, with sales growth we expect to control for differences in the ability of 
firms to actually take advantage of those investment opportunities (La Porta, Lopez-de-
Silanes, Schleifer and Vishny, 2002). Since the potential for rapid growth and actual rapid 
growth involves risk, we expect that the WACC will be positively related to both Tobin’s q 
and sales growth.  
Moreover, we include the natural logarithm of total assets to control for firm size. Since it 
has been argued that firm size reduces the probability of default (Hasan et al., 2015), we 
expect a negative correlation between firm size and the WACC. We also include industry 
dummy variables to control for the fact that project risk will likely vary depending on the 
industry.  
Finally, our econometric specifications include time dummy variables to control for time 
fixed effects. The inclusion of time dummy variables follows recent work on the suitability 
of econometric methods in corporate finance. In particular, we follow the work of Petersen 
(2009) who shows that when using panel datasets in corporate finance a pooled regression 
with time dummy variables and standard errors clustered by firm can be used to avoid 
important pitfalls. In our econometric section bellow we will follow this approach.  
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4. DATA AND ECONOMETRIC RESULTS 
4.1. Sample selection and description 
We start with a random sample of 586 publicly listed U.S. firms with relevant data 
available both in the Datastream and Bloomberg databases. We then exclude banks, 
insurance and financial services companies since the accounting practices, risk and 
complexity of these companies is fundamentally different from those of most firms in the 
sample (Hasan et al., 2015). This reduces our final sample to 458 firms. Given that the 
Bloomberg data on the WACC starts in the year 2000, our period of study starts in that year 
and comprises the time period between 2000 and 2013.  
Table 1 presents summary statistics for the main variables included in our econometric 
models. As can be seen, the companies in our sample present substantial variation in their 
WACC, age, cash flows, debt to value ratios and other variables of interest for testing our 
hypotheses.  
[Insert Table 1 here] 
Table 2 presents pairwise correlations between the empirical variables. Importantly, the 
WACC has a negative correlation with our measure of firm age (lnfirmage) which is 
significant at the 1% level. This suggests that, as predicted by firm lifecycle theory, the 
WACC tends to fall as firms mature. Moreover, the table shows that WACC has a negative 
correlation with the natural logarithm of cash flows from operations (lnCF) and a positive 
correlation with the volatility of the cash flows from operations (CFrisk), both of which are 
also significant at the 1% level. This finding suggests that, as predicted by lifecycle theory, 
the WACC falls as the size of the cash flows from operations increases and the volatility of 
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the cash flows decreases. Conversely, note that there is a very strong correlation of 0.92 
(significant at the 1% level) between our measures of firm size (lnfirmsize) and cash flow 
size (lnCF), so that if we include both variables in our regressions we would likely have 
collinearity problems. For this reason, instead of including lnCF in the econometric 
regressions we decided to include the firm’s cash flows divided by total assets 
(CF/totalassets) instead. Although the pairwise correlation between WACC and 
CF/totalassets is positive and significant, we expect that once we control for firm size in the 
regression equations the relationship between these two variables will be negative.  
[Insert Table 2 here] 
On the other hand Table 2 shows that, as can be obviously expected, the correlation 
between the WACC and the debt to value ratio (D/(D+E)) is negative and significant at the 
1% level, while the correlation between the debt to value ratio and our measure of firm age 
is positive and significant at the 1% level. These two correlations imply that as firms get 
older their debt to value ratio increases (firms use relatively more debt), and in turn, that this 
increase in the use of leverage is one of the mechanisms that cause the WACC to fall as firms 
mature. 
Interestingly, Table 2 shows that the correlations between WACC and Tobin’s q on the 
one hand and WACC and sales growth (salesgrowth) on the other are positive and significant, 
while the correlations between Tobin’s q and firm age on the one hand and sales growth and 
firm age on the other are negative and significant. Viewed through the lens of firm lifecycle 
theory this suggests that young firms have abundant attractive investment opportunities and 
are growing fast compared to mature firms, but that they have relatively higher WACC as 
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depicted in Figure 1. Finally, the correlation matrix shows a positive and significant 
correlation between our measures of firm age and firm size, and a negative and significant 
correlation between firm size and WACC. This implies that as firms mature they become 
larger and as a consequence of their larger size their WACC decreases. As it has been argued 
elsewhere in the literature, one plausible explanation for this observation is that firm size 
reduces the probability of default, and for this reason the WACC will tend to fall as firm size 
increases (Hasan et al., 2015). 
 
4.2. Econometric results 
Table 3 presents the results of our econometric analysis. In particular, columns 1a trough 
1e present the estimates for the five specifications discussed in section 3. As can be seen all 
the specifications imply that WACC falls with firm age which is consistent with the 
predictions of firm lifecycle theory. On the other hand, we cannot choose among the five 
specifications in terms of fit to the data as all of them present a very similar adjusted R2.  
[Insert Table 3 here] 
To facilitate our discussion on the trend of the WACC as firms get older, in Table 4 we 
present the WACCs for different firm ages implied by the estimates of Table 3. To obtain the 
values shown, we held all variables (other than WACC and firm age) at their mean values 
while varying firm age and taking note of the changes in the WACC. The last row of Table 
4 presents the age of the firm (Age*) at which its estimated WACC equals the average WACC 
in the sample (i.e. 8.92%) as implied by the estimates in each econometric model. The five 
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specifications indicate that for the average firm its WACC falls below the average WACC in 
the sample at some point between its 52nd and 71st year after its incorporation.  
[Insert Table 4 here] 
Among our econometric specifications, probably models 1b and 1d are the most 
plausible as they describe a gradual decline in the WACC until it reaches 8.69% and 8.66% 
in the limit respectively.2 Conversely, 1a and 1e are somewhat implausible as their functional 
forms both imply a continual decline with the WACC eventually turning negative. Finally, 
model 1c implies that the average firm’s WACC begins to rise after 133 years. One possible 
reason why this increase in the WACC could happen would be if the average firm enters a 
phase of general decline around this age. However, as the coefficient of age squared in model 
1c is insignificant at any level of significance, we consider the implications of this model as 
somewhat implausible. 
Returning to Table 3, the results show a negative relationship between WACC and 
CF/totalassets which is significant at the 1% level or 5% level depending on the econometric 
specification. Our results imply, that if CF/totalassets increases by one standard deviation, 
the average firm’s WACC falls by around 0.12 to 0.14 percentage points depending on the 
econometric model. On the other hand, the table shows a positive relationship between 
WACC and CFrisk which is significant at the 1% level. According to our results, if CFrisk 
increases by one standard deviation, then the WACC of the average firm increases by about 
0.27 to 0.28 percentage points depending on the model. Thus, from these results we conclude 
that the impact of both variables on the WACC is also economically significant. In addition, 
                                                          
2 This discussion follows Mueller and Yun (1998, 360) who use similar econometric specifications in another 
context, namely in the investigation of the behavior of rates of return over the lifecycle of the firm.  
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since CF/totalassets and CFrisk control for the impact of cash flow size and volatility on the 
WACC, we conclude that the observed fall of the WACC as firm age increases (Table 4) is 
consistent with the existence of a “reputation effect” as hypothesized in section 2. Thus, our 
results are consistent with the lifecycle theory prediction that mature firms have a lower 
WACC due to their higher reputation and their relatively less volatile and bigger cash flows 
compared to new firms. 
Turning to the control variables, all models in Table 3 show a negative relationship 
between WACC and the debt to value ratio (D/(D+E)), which is significant at the 1% level. 
This corroborates the widely held proposition that, since the cost of debt is typically lower 
than the cost of equity, as firms use proportionally more debt their WACC will fall. On the 
other hand, contrary to our expectations Table 3 shows a negative relationship between 
WACC and Tobin’s q which is significant the 1% level for all specifications. This result 
suggests that, in the context of our study, Tobin’s q is not functioning as a proxy for 
investment opportunities, rather Tobin’s q represents a measure of firm valuation. In this 
sense, we conclude that the negative relationship between WACC and Tobin’s q is due to the 
fact that, other things equal, as the firm’s debt and equity are valued more highly by the 
market relative to assets its cost of capital will be lower. In contrast, the table shows a positive 
relationship between WACC and salesgrowth which is significant at the 5% level. This 
corroborates our prediction that since actual rapid growth involves substantial risk, WACC 
should be positively related to salesgrowth. Finally, as expected we find a negative 
relationship between WACC and lnfirmsize which is significant at the 1% level. If firm size 
reduces the probability of default as has been hypothesized elsewhere (Hasan et al., 2015), 
then this lower risk of default should translate into a lower WACC. 
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4.3. Discussion of results  
Firm lifecycle theory predicts that the WACC of the large modern corporation will tend 
to fall as companies become older. In this paper we present the first empirical test of this 
prediction and we find that the evidence is consistent with this expectation. In particular, we 
find that as firms mature the size of their cash flows from operations increases, while the 
volatility of said cash flows tends to decrease. These two facts reduce the overall riskiness of 
the firm and consequently the WACC falls with firm age. Interestingly, we find that even 
after controlling for cash flow size, cash flow volatility and other controls, WACC tends to 
fall with firm age. We hypothesize that this effect may be caused by a “reputation effect”. 
That is, since investors should be less uncertain about the future performance of mature firms, 
they should require a lower risk premium from these companies which should result in a 
lower WACC.  
Ex-post we find that the other variables employed in this work, which are found to have 
a significant impact on the WACC, are also related to firm age. For instance, the results show 
that firm size is positively correlated with firm age and that larger firms have a lower WACC. 
This suggests that another mechanism through which firm lifecycle dynamics impact the 
WACC is the increase in size that the firm usually experiments as it matures, since as has 
been argued elsewhere larger firms have a lower risk of default (Hassan et al., 2015). As 
another case in point, consider our result that younger firms tend to grow faster as measured 
by salesgrowth and that fast growing firms have a higher WACC. One likely explanation for 
this result is that the rapid growth generally experimented by young firms involves taking 
relatively higher risks and this higher risks increase the required return demanded by 
investors which in turn results in a higher WACC.  
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Interestingly, our results show that the debt to value ratio (D/(D+E)) is positively 
correlated with firm age. Since the WACC usually falls as the proportion of debt increases 
(as debt is typically less costly than equity), we conclude that one reason the WACC falls as 
firms mature is that lenders likely perceive mature firms as relatively less risky and are more 
willing to make debt capital available to these firms. Finally, we find that Tobin’s q has a 
negative correlation with firm age. As discussed above, if we consider Tobin’s q as a 
valuation proxy (as opposed to a proxy for investment opportunities) this result suggests that 
young firms are usually more highly valued by the market than mature firms. In turn, this 
higher valuation reduces the WACC for young firms. 
  
5. CONCLUSION 
This paper tests the prediction of firm lifecycle theory that the WACC of the firm will 
tend to fall as it becomes older. Since there is good a priori reason to expect that the opposite 
could happen, as previous research suggests that corporate governance deteriorates as 
companies mature (Mueller, 2003, pp. 80-81; Saravia and Saravia-Matus, 2014), the 
econometric tests performed in the present paper are important and necessary to clarify this 
question. 
Our results show strong support for the proposition that the WACC of mature firms is 
significantly lower than that of new firms. If we take into account that previous work on firm 
investment performance finds that mature firms tend to destroy value by deliberately 
investing in projects with negative net present value (Mueller and Yun, 1998; Saravia, 2014), 
our evidence comes to shed new light on the magnitude of the corporate governance problems 
17 
 
of mature firms. Putting these two facts together, that mature firms overinvest even though 
they have access to cheaper capital, we conclude that the corporate governance problems of 
mature firms are severer than what previous literature might suggest. Clearly, the implication 
is that mature firms are destroying value by undertaking projects with some of the lowest 
rates of return in the economy. 
 
APPENDIX 
This appendix explains how the empirical variables used in the paper were constructed 
as well as the sources of data employed. Our main sources of market and accounting data are 
Bloomberg and Datastream. We take the estimate of our main variable of interest, the 
WACC, from Bloomberg. Bloomberg calculates the WACC using the following equation: 
WACC = KD (TD/V) + KP (P/V) + KE (E/V)                               (A.1) 
Where: KD is the after-tax weighted average cost of debt for the firm, TD is the total 
debt of the company, KP is the cost of preferred equity computed by dividing the sum paid 
in preferred dividends by the firm’s preferred equity capital, P is the firm’s preferred equity 
capital, KE is the cost of equity derived using the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), E is 
the firm’s equity capital, and V is the company’s total capital which is computed as the sum 
of total debt, preferred equity and equity capital (V = TD + P + E). 
We construct our other key variable, firm age, by subtracting the year in which the firm 
was incorporated from the appropriate year in the panel dataset to obtain the number of years 
since the firm’s incorporation. Our main data sources to construct this variable are the 
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Mergent Industrial Manual which lists companies’ dates of incorporation, and the date of 
incorporation Datastream datatype (wc18273).3  
On the other hand, the variable CF/totalassets is constructed by dividing the firm’s funds 
from operations (wc04201) by the book value of its total assets (wc02999) at the end of the 
company’s fiscal year end. Furthermore, the volatility of firm cash flows, CFrisk, is 
computed as the standard deviation of the firm’s funds from operations (wc04201) over a 
three year period, from the end of fiscal year t-2 to t. The debt to value ratio D/(D+E) is 
constructed by dividing the firm’s total debt (wc03255) over total debt plus the firm’s market 
capitalization. Where, market capitalization is equal to the number of common shares 
outstanding (wc05301) times share price (P) at the date of the firm’s fiscal year end.  
Tobin’s q is computed by dividing the market value of the firm over the book value of 
total assets (wc02999). Where, the market value of the firm is calculated by adding the firm’s 
market capitalization (wc05301 x P) to its total debt (wc03255) and preferred stock 
(wc03451). The salesgrowth variable is computed by finding the yearly percentage change 
in the company’s net sales (wc01001) from one fiscal year end to the next. Conversely, 
lnfirmsize is measured as the natural logarithm of total assets (wc02999) at the firm’s fiscal 
year end, where the total assets are previously deflated by using the CPI (2010 = 1). The CPI 
data for the U.S.A were taken from the International Monetary Fund, World Economic 
Outlook Database, of April 2015. Finally, industry dummy variables were constructed based 
on the FTSE/DJ Industry Classification Benchmark super sector codes (icbssc) obtained from 
Datastream.  
                                                          
3 Throughout this appendix Datastream datatypes are presented in parenthesis. 
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Table 1. Summary Statistics  
This table presents summary statistics for the main variables included in our econometric models. WACC 
is the weighted average cost of capital as measured by Bloomberg (see the appendix). firmage is firm 
age measured in years since the company’s incorporation date. lnfirmage is the natural logarithm of firm 
age which is measured in years since the company’s incorporation date. CF/totalassets is the ratio of the 
firm cash flows from operations during year t divided by total assets at the end of year t. CFrisk three 
year volatility of these cash flows calculated as the standard deviation of the firm’s cash flows from 
operations from year t-2 to t. D/(D+E) is the debt to value ratio calculated as the book value of firm debt 
to the book value of debt plus the market value of equity. Tobin´s q equals the market value of the firm 
at the end of year t divided by the book value of total assets at the end of year t. salesgrowth is the 
percentage change in the firm’s total sales between the end of year t-1 and the end of year t. lnfirmsize is 
the natural logarithm of the book value of the firm’s total assets measured at the end of year t in thousands 
of constant 2010 U.S. dollars. 
 
Variable N Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max 
       
WACC (%) 4785 8.9223 8.6840 2.3425 2.2820 25.7970 
firmage 4785 71.4397 76.0000 31.7374 3.0000 165.0000 
lnfirmage 4785 4.1401 4.3307 0.5560 1.0986 5.1059 
CF/totalassets 4785 0.1061 0.0982 0.0657 -0.3643 0.5265 
CFrisk 4785 0.0251 0.0167 0.0278 0.0001 0.3128 
D/(D+E) 4785 0.2555 0.2199 0.1914 0.0000 0.9905 
Tobin’s q 4785 1.3906 1.0991 0.9805 0.0065 15.8453 
salesgrowth 4785 0.0638 0.0550 0.2120 -0.8369 4.6195 
lnfirmsize 4785 15.3940 15.3220 1.5251 11.0649 20.5767 
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Table 2. Correlation matrix 
This table presents the correlation matrix for the main variables included in our econometric models. Variable 
definitions are presented in Table 1 and their construction is discussed in the appendix, with the exception of lnCF 
which is the natural logarithm of cash flows from operations measured at the end of year t in thousands of constant 
2010 U.S. dollars. ** and * indicate a statistically significant correlation at the 1% and 5% level respectively. 
Variable WACC lnfirmage 
CF/total-
assets 
lnCF CFrisk D/(D+E) Tobin’s q 
Sales-
growth 
Firm-
size 
          
WACC 1.0000         
lnfirmage -0.2245** 1.0000        
CF/totalassets 0.1529** -0.1081** 1.0000       
lnCF -0.1349** 0.1037** 0.3135** 1.0000      
CFrisk 0.2521** -0.2126** -0.0277 -0.1600** 1.0000     
D/(D+E) -0.5296** 0.2314** -0.4610** -0.0356** -0.1148** 1.0000    
Tobin’s q 0.1649** -0.2472** 0.5469** 0.1474** 0.1514** -0.5263** 1.0000   
salesgrowth 0.0283* -0.0472** 0.1566** 0.0813** -0.0224 -0.0898** 0.1013** 1.0000  
lnfirmsize -0.2253** 0.1714** 0.0574** 0.9244** -0.2260** 0.1522** -0.0226 0.0582** 1.0000 
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Table 3. Econometric results 
This table presents the results of regressing WACC on firm age and control variables. Variable definitions are presented 
in Table 1 and their construction is discussed in the appendix. Note that we include year dummy variables to pick up 
movements in stock market values that are common to all firms, as well as industry dummy variables which we construct 
based on the FTSE/DJ Industry Classification Benchmark (ICB) super sector codes. ** and * indicate a statistically 
significant coefficient at the 1% and 5% level respectively. We report standard errors clustered by firm in parentheses. 
Variable 
Predicted 
sign 
1a 1b 1c 1d 1e 
        
Intercept +    13.0758**   12.5448**   13.2956**   12.5018**   14.1536** 
   (0.5550) (0.5739) (0.5787) (0.5802) (0.6060) 
       
firmage -    -0.0056**    -0.0126*   
   (0.0014)  (0.0056)   
        
1/firmage +   12.1249**    14.0484**  
    (2.3131)  (3.9994)  
       
firmage2  ?   0.00005   
     (0.00004)   
        
1/firmage2 ?    -14.8501  
      (16.6617)  
        
lnfirmage -       -0.3536** 
       (0.0805) 
       
CF/totalassets -    -2.1391**  -1.8808*   -2.0736**        -1.8950*    -2.0282** 
  (0.7816) (0.7876) (0.7889) (0.7865) (0.7815) 
       
CFrisk +     9.8223**   10.0411**    9.7712**     9.9773**     9.7993** 
  (2.3424) (2.3372) (2.3264) (2.3339) (2.3272) 
       
D/(D+E) -    -5.0739**   -5.1088**    -5.0736**    -5.1068**    -5.0841** 
  (0.3061) (0.3060) (0.3055) (0.3059) (0.3055) 
       
Tobin’s q +   -0.1649**   -0.1969**   -0.1716**   -0.1954**    -0.1789** 
  (0.0515) (0.0509) (0.0515) (0.0506) (0.0507) 
       
salesgrowth +   0.2952*   0.2799* 0.2882*   0.2806*   0.2862* 
  (0.1304) (0.1256) (0.1287) (0.1256) (0.1281) 
       
lnfirmsize -    -0.1575**   -0.1593**   -0.1566**    -0.1584**    -0.1562** 
  (0.0313) (0.0310) (0.0312) (0.0311) (0.0312) 
        
Industry dummy 
variables? 
 yes yes yes yes yes 
        
Time dummy 
variables? 
 yes yes yes yes yes 
       
       
Adjusted R2  0.5796 0.5806 0.5801 0.5806 0.5805 
Number of 
observations 
 4785 4785 4785 4785 4785 
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Table 4. Calculated WACCs for different firm ages under each econometric model 
This table presents calculated WACCs implied by the estimates in each econometric model. In these calculations we 
hold all variables, other than WACC and firm age, at their mean values. The last row presents the age of the firm, 
Age*, at which its estimated WACC equals the average WACC in the sample i.e. 8.92% as implied by the estimates 
in each econometric model. 
 WACC (%) 
Firm Age 1a 1b 1c 1d 1e 
1 9.31 20.81 9.52 7.86 10.39 
5 9.29 11.11 9.47 10.88 9.82 
10 9.26 9.90 9.41 9.92 9.57 
20 9.21 9.30 9.30 9.33 9.33 
30 9.15 9.09 9.20 9.11 9.18 
40 9.10 8.99 9.10 9.00 9.08 
50 9.04 8.93 9.02 8.94 9.00 
60 8.99 8.89 8.95 8.89 8.94 
70 8.93 8.86 8.88 8.86 8.88 
80 8.87 8.84 8.83 8.84 8.84 
90 8.82 8.82 8.78 8.82 8.80 
100 8.76 8.81 8.75 8.80 8.76 
110 8.71 8.80 8.72 8.79 8.72 
120 8.65 8.79 8.70 8.78 8.69 
130 8.60 8.78 8.69 8.77 8.67 
140 8.54 8.78 8.70 8.76 8.64 
150 8.49 8.77 8.71 8.75 8.61 
160 8.43 8.77 8.73 8.75 8.59 
      
Age* 71 52 64 53 63 
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Fig. 1. The WACC over the lifecycle of the firm. Source: adapted from Mueller (2003, p. 80)  
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